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Institutional Controls-An Expedited
and Cost-Effective Means for
Returning a Superfund Site to
Beneficial Use
ANNE D. WEBER*
The Government has spent $15 billion on the Superfund' pro-
gram since 1981 and continues to spend almost $2 billion a year,
with costs frequently exceeding $10 million an acre. Yet only 180
sites have completed cleanups by 1993, with 65 to 70 additional
sites expected to achieve cleanup each coming year.2 A growing
consensus is emerging among local communities,' states," and the
federal government, 5 including the Environmental Protection
* Ms. Weber practices environmental and natural resources law with the firm, Parcel,
Mauro, Hultin & Spaanstra, P.C., Denver, Co.; J.D., 1990, Vanderbilt University School
of Law; B.S., 1977, University of Wyoming. She has prepared institutional controls analy-
ses and recommendations for several western Superfund sites. This Article reflects the
views of the author.
The term "Superfund" is the commonly used reference to the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 1-531, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986) (amending scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
2 See Keith Schneider, What Price Cleanup? New View Calls Environmental Policy
Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, § 1, at I [hereinafter What Price Cleanup].
I Communities such as Bartlesville, Oklahoma and Aspen, Colorado have actively op-
posed cleanup of contaminated sites within their boundaries under the Superfund program.
See, e.g., Keith Schneider, A White Knight Tarnished, NY TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, § 1, at 7
[hereinafter A White Knight Tarnished].
I Even Jim Florio, former Governor of New Jersey and a principal author of the
Superfund law, has questioned the use of Superfund resources to make all sites pristine.
See What Price Cleanup, supra note 2 (quoting Florio as saying: "It doesn't make any
sense to clean up a rail yard in downtown Newark so it can be a drinking water reservoir").
I As recently as December of 1992, the General Accounting Office focused on the
difficulty of supporting the ever-increasing costs of the Superfund program as federal re-
sources become more limited: "The federal government cannot afford to spend the hun-
dreds of billions of dollars expected to be needed to clean up Superfund sites without good
assurance that this level of funding is appropriate." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE. GAO/HR-93-10, SUPERFUND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 35 (1992).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
Agency (EPA),' that Superfund sites must be returned to benefi-
cial uses faster and at less cost. 7 The reauthorization process8 of-
fers an opportunity to improve the Superfund program.9
Institutional controls, which are restrictions on the use of
land or water imposed at a Superfund site, are one mechanism for
returning Superfund sites to beneficial uses within their communi-
ties faster, more efficiently, and at less cost. The track record of
the Superfund program shows that institutional controls ulti-
mately have been imposed as a necessity to protect health and the
environment at the majority of Superfund sites. Returning
Superfund sites to beneficial uses faster should significantly re-
duce opposition from local communities which are increasingly
and actively opposing Superfund cleanups within their boundaries,
6 See UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EXEC. SUMM., SUPERFUND AD-
MINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, I (June 23, 1993) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVE-
MENTS] (stating that the "EPA recognizes that the Superfund program has also generated
criticism [with] specific criticisms focus[ing] on the pace and cost of cleanup, [and] the
degree to which sites are cleaned up"); see also A White Knight Tarnished, supra note 3
(relating Robert Sussman's, the Deputy EPA Administrator and chair of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's Superfund Steering Committee, predictions that "the Administration is
likely to champion a host of significant changes for making Superfund cleanups less expen-
sive and easier").
I A New York Times commentator has described the recent consensus for Superfund
reform:
Now a new Administration intent on strengthening environmental policy is
settling into office when competition for scarce financial resources is keen. At
the same time, a wealth of new research shows that some of the nation's
environmental protection efforts are excessively costly . . This view is the
vanguard of a new, third wave of environmentalism that is sweeping across
America . ... (L]eaders of the nation's conservation organizations believe
the new view is misguided .... Still, in the last few years the wave has
moved into universities, city halls, state capitols and even to the highest levels
of the EPA.
What Price Cleanup. supra note 2.
8 In October of 1990, the 101st Congress approved a three-year extension of the
Superfund program and a four-year extension of Superfund tax authority as part of a com-
prehensive budget bill, House Bill 5835, which did not include any substantive changes to
the Superfund program. The Superfund program expires on September 30, 1994 and the
taxes that fuel much of the program expire on December 31, 1995. See CERCLA § Ill,
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
The EPA emphasized its commitment to Superfund reform:
This point in Superfund history presents the Clinton Administration, Con-
gress, EPA, and the public an opportunity to evaluate how the program has
worked over the last dozen years and to make changes that will improve
Superfund in the future. The Agency is committed to making such changes,
whether they are administrative changes which can be implemented by EPA
on its own, or legislative changes that must be enacted by Congress.
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 1.
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fearing the costs, lengthy disturbances, and stigma to their com-
munities."0 Although institutional controls are effective in restrict-
ing public use of land and water at or near the Superfund site,
conversely, they may also increase the Superfund site's value to
the community and the community's role in the remedy selection
process. Institutional controls allow affected lands to return to ei-
ther business or recreational uses faster, thus improving local
property values" and allowing jobs and businesses to return to the
site or encouraging sustainable industry to locate within the af-
fected area. Even former Superfund sites located within predomi-
nantly residential areas may present a community with a large
land area suitable for desirable future land-use options, such as a
golf course, wildlife area or park, or airport expansion, so long as
institutional controls are in place to protect public health and the
environment as necessary. 2
Part I of this article describes the flexible concept of institu-
tional controls and identifies what types of land and water use re-
strictions are available and how they are typically implemented at
Superfund sites. Part II examines the role of institutional controls
under the current Superfund scheme. Part III explores the nearly
full spectrum of roles contemplated for institutional controls
within the first wave of Superfund reform proposals from the ad-
ministrative branch, the legislature, and private entities. This arti-
cle concludes that the EPA's initial proposal for Superfund rem-
10 The New York Times told of one local community, Metamora, Michigan, where
support for Superfund cleanup activities turned to opposition in A White Knight Tar-
nished, supra note 3. When remedial activities began at the Metamora landfill in 1984,
local residents had not been exposed to hazardous chemicals which had been buried at the
site, and only traces of contamination were identified in a shallow aquifer. Environmental
quality in the vicinity of the site degraded, however, when the wastes were excavated. In
addition to increased exposure to the now-excavated hazardous substances, the local com-
munity endured noxious smells, noise, and traffic congestion as a result of the remedial
activities. Cleanup has cost $36 million to date, with the EPA estimating that at least 35
million additional dollars are required to handle the thousands of excavated barrels and
buried barrels that remain onsite.
" See generally Jenifer S. Heath, Remedial Strategies Should Enhance Property
Value, in 5 HAZARDOUS WASTE STRATEGIES UPDATE 12, 20 (1993).
" The Rocky Mountain Arsenal is a large Department of Defense site within an ur-
ban area that has been labelled one of the most toxic sites in the nation. See 138 CONG
REC. S14093 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Brown). The Rocky Mountain
Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992 was passed to allow this site to return im-
mediately to beneficial use as a wildlife area through the incorporation of a variety of
perpetual restrictions, including a ban on residential or industrial use and a drinking water
ban. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1993); see generally David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls at
Superfund Sites, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,279 (May 1993).
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edy selection reform presents the best vision for the appropriate
role of institutional controls under a reauthorized Superfund pro-
gram. The EPA's proposal elevates the role of cost-effective re-
sponse measures, such as institutional controls equal to or greater
than treatment measures during remedy selection if appropriate
for a site (based on whether the community has identified the fu-
ture use of the site as residential or restricted), to expedite the
site's return to beneficial use.
1. INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ARE SITE-SPECIFIC USE
RESTRICTIONS
Institutional controls, most simply stated, are legal or barrier
restrictions on the public's use of land or water in the vicinity of a
site subject to cleanup under federal or state law. Although fre-
quently and widely used at Superfund sites, neither the 1980
CERCLA, the 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA, nor the
EPA's accompanying regulations, have defined institutional con-
trols. Moreover, the EPA has issued little guidance specifically ad-
dressing institutional controls."3 The lack of either a rigid defini-
tion or regulatory criteria allows institutional controls to be a
flexible concept, adaptable to the needs of each specific Superfund
site. For example, institutional controls may be as temporary or
permanent in duration as needed. At many sites they are used as
an interim protective measure before or during remedial actions or
between a removal and subsequent remedial action. Other sites
where residual hazardous substances remain onsite after cleanup
may require perpetual maintenance institutional controls.
13 Memorandum from Howard Corcoran, Associate General Counsel, Grants, Claims,
and Intergovernmental Division. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, to Regional Counsels (July
27, 1992) (on file with JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW) (re-
garding use of institutional controls at Superfund Sites) [herinafter OGC Institutional Con-
trols Memo]. Before the EPA issued the OGC Institutional Controls Memo, several other
EPA guidance documents had peripherally discussed institutional controls. See OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OSWER DIREC-
TIVE 9283.1-2. GUIDANCE ON REMEDIAL ACTIONS FOR CONTAMINATED GROUND WATER
AT SUPERFUND SITES 5-4 (DEC. 1988); Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant Admin-
istrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, to Regional Administrators, Regions I-X and vari-
ous Regional Directors (Dec. 3, 1988) (on file with the JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES
& ENVIRONMENTAL LAW) (discussing the policy on management of post-removal site con-
trol and defining institutional controls as "controls which generally limit human activities




An institutional control is an umbrella concept which incor-
porates a wide variety of mechanisms that restrict access or use of
land and water to some degree. Barrier restrictions, such as fenc-
ing, warning signs, and security personnel, are the most basic, and
widely used type of institutional control. Other types of institu-
tional controls accomplish the following: restrict the use of ground
water for drinking or agricultural purposes, such as well construc-
tion bans or permits, well use advisories, and water quality certifi-
cation requirements; restrict the use of land and disturbance to
soil through mechanisms such as excavation or building ordi-
nances and deed notices or restrictions; or restrict access to sur-
face water. At least one Superfund site has expanded the institu-
tional control concept to include "community protection
measures," public policy and education programs designed to re-
strict or minimize the public's exposure to residually contaminated
media by increasing public awareness.
14
Institutional controls may be imposed at a Superfund site by
governmental entities or private parties, typically landowners
named as potentially responsible parties (PRPs).' 5 Section 104 of
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to implement institutional controls
indirectly through other entities such as state or local govern-
ments, or more rarely, directly at the site.'" Because water and
use restrictions fall within the traditional police powers of state
and local governments, the EPA commonly enters into cooperative
agreements, pursuant to Section 104(d), with state or local gov-
ernments for those entities to implement and to enforce institu-
tional controls, or enters into Superfund State Contracts in which
14 See generally Draft from ICF Technology Inc., to Region X, Hazardous Waste
Management Division, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (May 1991) (on file with JOURNAL
OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW) (discussing community protection
measures for the Ruston/North Tacoma Residential Study Area). Early in the remedy
selection process for the Ruston/North Tacoma Residential Study Area, an operable unit
at the Commencement Bay/Nearshore Tideflats Superfund Site located in Tacoma, Wash-
ington, the EPA had anticipated that community protection measures would be a necessary
component of the remedy selected at the Site, id. at 1-4. The study area covered approxi-
mately 950 acres of mostly residential land use within a one and one-half mile radius of the
Asarco Tacoma Smelter, id. at 1-1.
15 The current landowner is one of four categories of potentially responsible persons
(PRPs) that may be liable under CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
Is 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) allows the EPA to undertake response actions directly that
are consistent with the NCP, such as the implementation of institutional controls. The
EPA could also impose use controls directly after it acquires the real property interests at a
site under 42 U.S.C. § 96046).
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the state, pursuant to Section 104(c), assures the EPA that it will
operate and maintain a remedy (including enforcing institutional
controls). To implement and enforce institutional controls, state
governments typically will enact statutes or regulations, and local
governments will either enact ordinances specifically restricting
activities such as excavation, building, or soil disturbance or util-
ize their zoning powers to restrict certain types of land use. In any
case, an intergovernmental approach is required because
Superfund does not give EPA the power or duty to maintain or
administer a site after cleanup is completed.'
7
The EPA may require private parties to impose institutional
controls upon their affected property under the authority of Sec-
tion 106 of CERCLA, which allows the EPA to issue "orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment."' 18 Private landowners may also voluntarily encum-
ber their property with use restrictions, usually by entering into a
consent decree or other contractual arrangement with the EPA. 9
II. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS UNDER THE
CURRENT SUPERFUND SCHEME
The term "institutional controls" is not mentioned within the
Superfund statute and remains undefined and unexplained within
the EPA's Superfund regulations. Nevertheless, for more than a
decade, the EPA has authorized the use of institutional controls at
many Superfund sites. Before the 1986 SARA amendments, the
Superfund program focused on identifying immediate threats and
reducing risks by imposing relatively inexpensive response mea-
sures, such as institutional controls and containment. In 1986
alone, the EPA approved more than 20 cleanup plans which incor-
17 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c) merely directs the EPA to review remedial action taken at a
Superfund site at least every five years to determine whether the remedy is adequately
protecting public health and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9606.
Proprietary restrictions imposed by private property owners are less common, and
carry more risks, than restrictions imposed by governmental entities. Private party land-
owners will rarely voluntarily encumber their property with use restrictions in the absence
of a legal obligation to do so. Moreover, such encumbrances are subject to the require-
ments of the state law in which the property is located. For example, the encumbrance
must not be so restrictive that it is prohibited as a restraint on alienation. See generally
OGC Institutional Controls Memo, supra note 13. Nevertheless, there are sites where a
private party has sufficient resources and control over the land and influence within the
community to impose institutional controls successfully, such as the Whitewood Creek,
South Dakota Superfund Site. See infra note 34.
[VOL. 9:461
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porated institutional controls." The EPA first described the con-
cept of use restrictions as a component of a remedy and utilized
the terms "institutional controls," "institutional considerations,"
and "institutional means" within the 1988 Preamble to the Pro-
posed National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contin-
gency Plan (NCP)21 and subsequently within the 1990 Preamble
to, and the text of, the Revised NCP regulations."
Although the current Superfund statute does not mention the
term "institutional controls," it does recognize the need for tempo-
rary or perpetual use restrictions at many Superfund sites. For
example, Section 121(c)23 recognizes that even well-designed and
well-performed remedial cleanup actions may inevitably leave
some hazardous substances remaining at a site. In certain situa-
tions, remediation technology limitations" or certain site-specific
"0 As acknowledged by the EPA in the Consent Decree for United States v. Shell,
more than 20 cleanup plans approved by EPA in 1986 incorporated some type of institu-
tional controls:
A review of records of decisions approved by EPA in a single year, 1986,
discloses that over 20 cleanup plans incorporated some type of institutional
controls-including zoning restrictions to limit certain types of development
(one site); deed restrictions to prohibit specific lands uses (six sites); deed
restrictions to prohibit consumptive use of groundwater (four sites); creation
of economic incentives for well owners to discontinue the use of their wells
(one site); other types of institutional restrictions for the use of groundwater
wells (four sites); owner enforced restrictions on site access (three sites); and
various other types of regulatory constraints on uses of land and
groundwater.
United States' June 7, 1988 Response to Comments Received on the Proposed Consent
Decree of February 1, 1988, United States v. Shell Oil Co., 650 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo.
1988) (No. 83-C-2379).
S See Preamble to the Proposed NCP, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394 (1988). The NCP,
promulgated by the EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) and codified within 40
C.F.R. pt. 300 establishes operating rules for Superfund cleanups.
" See Preamble to the Revised NCP, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,703 (1990) (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 300.430).
23 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c).
" Even if cost is not a factor, remedial technology may not be adequate to achieve
cleanup standards or a reasonable timetable for cleanup at sites where a variety of con-
taminants or mixed contaminated media (e.g. soil, water, sludges) are present, or for sites
requiring long-term treatment actions (e.g. pump and treat groundwater sites). For exam-
ple, metals contained within contaminated media may prohibit that media from being in-
cinerated to destroy organic contaminants. The EPA has acknowledged that pump and
treat remedial actions, the most common treatment remedy for groundwater contamination
to date, may not clean up an aquifer to standards because "hydrogeologic and contaminant
characteristics as well as system design factors ...may impede the ability of extraction
systems to achieve appropriate cleanup levels over the entire area of contamination." Mem-
orandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, Considerations in Groundwater Remediation at Superfund Sites and
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practical or community-based limitations25 may result in residual
contamination left at the site. Moreover, Section 104(c)2 6 requires
that before the EPA provides remedial action at a site, the state in
which the site is located must provide certain assurances, includ-
ing an assurance of all future maintenance.
Section 121(b) of CERCLA 7 sets general rules requiring
that the remedy selected for a Superfund site be based on perma-
nent treatment technologies (to the maximum extent practicable),
be protective of human health and the environment, as well as be
cost effective2 8 and appropriate.2 9 Of these rather contradictory
directives, the EPA has emphasized the preference for treatment
technologies rather than more cost-effective measures, such as in-
stitutional controls, which reduce exposure to or limit the adverse
affects of hazardous pollutants rather than providing a permanent
remedy." From 1988 to 1990 when revising the NCP, the EPA
did establish two roles for institutional controls: (1) to supplement
the chosen remedy, such as when some waste is left in place as it
is in most response actions; or (2) as the sole remedy when active
response measures are not practicable and institutional controls
may be the only means available to provide protection to the pub-
lic." The EPA's most common use of institutional controls is as
RCRA Facilities-Update 2 (May 27, 1992)(OSWER Directive 9283.1-06) (on file with
the JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW). Institutional controls
also may be necessary in conjunction with innovative onsite remedial technologies such as
bioremediation, chemical extraction or treatment, thermal desorption, in situ soil flushing,
and vacuum extraction, that also may leave residual waste materials.
15 Various communities have opposed onsite incineration or offsite transportation of
the waste through the community to a suitable disposal area even when those remedial
actions may be the most effective. See A White Knight Tarnished, supra note 3.
26 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c).
2 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b).
28 The NCP instructs that: "[a] remedy shall be cost-effective if its costs are propor-
tional to its overall effectiveness." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(D) (1992).
29 The NCP further discusses what remedies or combinations of remedies are appro-
priate for various situations. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(iii).
10 The EPA's highest preference during remedy selection is for treatment-based reme-
dies: "EPA expects to use treatment to address the principal threats posed by a site, wher-
ever practicable. Principal threats for which treatment is most likely to be appropriate
include liquids, areas contaminated with high concentrations of toxic compounds, and
highly mobile materials." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (a)(iii)(A).
" See Preamble to the Revised NCP, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,703, 8,706, 8,711, 8,734 (1990).
The EPA acknowledged that institutional controls could help the EPA achieve its mandate
to protect human health and the environment:
The mandate for remedies that protect human health and the environment
can be fulfilled through a variety or combination of means. These means
include ... the application of treatment technologies. Protection can also be
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an integral component of a remedy, implemented after a treat-
ment technology is utilized to protect the public from any residual
risk remaining at the site.
Although institutional controls have been selected for a wide
variety of geographic areas, they may be particularly appropriate
at Superfund sites that are very large in size, that contain large
volumes of low concentrations of potentially toxic material, where
implementation of a treatment-based remedy would result in
greater overall risk to human health or the environment rather
than the management in place or would be made at a dispropor-
tionately large cost, or where a treatment technology is not techni-
cally feasible or is not available within a reasonable time frame.
32
The EPA has identified large municipal landfills or mining waste
sites as particular areas where treatment-based remedies might
not be applicable.33 For example, a variety of institutional controls
were recommended as appropriate for the Whitewood Creek,
South Dakota site, an "18-mile stretch of a river and adjacent
floodplains and woodlands" which included vast amounts of tail-
ings materials containing low concentrations of metals.3 4
The track record of the Superfund program demonstrates
that the EPA ultimately approves institutional controls as a neces-
sary part of the final remedy at many sites. By 1991, institutional
controls had been considered within the Records of Decision of
nearly 250 Superfund sites located in every EPA region."
provided in some cases by controlling exposure to contaminants through engi-
neering controls (such as containment) and/or institutional controls which
prevent access to contaminated areas.
55 Fed. Reg. 8,703 (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(iii)(C)-(D) (1992).
The NCP's provisions concerning the use of institutional controls withstood a challenge by
states in Ohio v. United States EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that
any remedy, including institutional controls, must meet the threshold requirement of
protectiveness).
11 See Preamble to the Revised NCP, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,703 (1990).
13 See Preamble to the Proposed NCP, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,422, 51,423 and 51,427
(1988).
" See REGION VIII, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENY, FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE
WHITEWOOD CREEK, SOUTH DAKOTA SUPERFUND SITE: A DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS. INCLUDING LAND USE RESTRICTIONS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH
ZONING REGULATIONS AND DEED RESTRICTIONS. AS SUPERFUND REMEDIAL MEASURES,
app. D, at 5 (Dec. 8, 1989) (on file with author); see also 55 Fed. Reg. 42,278 (1990)
(notice of lodging of consent decree in United States v. Homestake Mining Co., No. 90-
5101 (D. S.D. 1990)).
3' See, e.g., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 30000:48 (Aug. 1991) (listing Record
of Decision documents by EPA region which have addressed institutional controls).
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III. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS UNDER THE FIRST
WAVE OF REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSALS
A. The Administration's Reauthorization Activities
The EPA has acknowledged that the Superfund program
must be changed to allow sites to be cleaned up faster and at less
cost. 36 While some reform measures may be affected administra-
tively within the current Superfund framework,"' the majority of
significant reforms will require congressional amendments to
Superfund during the reauthorization process.
3 8
The Clinton Administration's first legislative reform effort
was to form an advisory group made up of a broad segment of
Superfund stakeholders, the Superfund Evaluation Subcommittee
within the National Advisory Committee on Environmental Tech-
nology and Policy (NACEPT). 39 By October of 1993, the
30 See ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6.
" The Clinton Administration first explored potential administrative improvements to
Superfund by establishing two interagency groups: (1) the Superfund Administrative Im-
provements Task Force (Task Force); and (2) the Superfund Steering Committee (Steering
Committee). See ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 1-2. The Task Force
includes representatives from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(OSWER), the Office of Enforcement (OE), the Office of General Counsel (OGC), the
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE), the Office of Administration and Re-
sources Management (OARM), the Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs
(OCLA), the Office of Research and Development (ORD), EPA Region 11, EPA Region
V, EPA Region IX, and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Steering Committee,
chaired by EPA Deputy Administrator Robert Sussman, oversees both legislative and ad-
ministrative Superfund reform and includes officials from OSWER, OE, OGC, OPPE,
OARM, OCLA, ORD, EPA Region I1, EPA Region III, EPA Region VI and DOJ.
The specific initiatives and action items developed by these groups by June 1993 made
no mention of institutional controls. With input from the Steering Committee, the Task
Force had developed nine specific initiatives, along with specific action items to improve the
Superfund program. See ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 4-9. Although
not acknowledged by these interagency workgroups, expanding the role of institutional con-
trols during remedy selection could have been listed as an action item for accomplishing
Initiative 5, "Streamlining and Expediting the Cleanup Process," and Initiative 8, "Early
and More Effective Community Involvement." ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra
note 6, at 4-9.
Although the interagency groups suggested administrative improvements to
Superfund that the EPA could implement immediately, the EPA also continued to assess
legislative reform. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 2-3.
" See ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 6, at 3 (describing the NACEPT
Subcommittee as including state and local governments, private industry, insurers, local
and minority community groups, and environmental groups). Carol Browner, EPA Admin-
istrator, has explained NACEPT's purpose is to "assure that EPA is fully informed about
the views of outside parties .. . [and encourage] . . . broad public dialogue on how
Superfund can be improved." Reauthorization of Superfund: Hearings Before the Sub-
[VOL. 9:461
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NACEPT Subcommittee had concluded its examination of
Superfund reform and within its position paper on remedy selec-
tion reform, specifically identified institutional controls as an im-
portant and necessary tool for reducing the costs and time of
cleanups. In particular, the diverse members of the NACEPT
Subcommittee reached a consensus that remedy selection should
be based on current and future land uses and that "legal vehicles
[such as institutional controls] to ensure that land use restrictions
remain in place in perpetuity . . . are needed to implement land-
use based decisionmaking." 40 The views held by the NACEPT
Subcommittee members diverged, however, on whether or not per-
manence and treatment should continue to be favored over more
cost-effective remedy components, such as institutional controls,
within the Superfund remedy selection process. 4' The industry
participants asserted that where institutional controls are sufficient
to meet the health and environmental standards, they should be
considered on an equal basis with treatment options.4 Although
the NACEPT Subcommittee did not endorse or develop specific
proposals in 1993, its conclusions may provide support for the po-
sition the Clinton Administration ultimately adopts.
Since June of 1993, the Clinton Administration's interagency
task force has vigorously debated the significant Superfund reform
issues, working towards development of a united proposal for
Superfund reauthorization from the administrative branch. In
early 1994, this task force purportedly agreed to the EPA's ex-
plicit proposal for allowing greater use of containment and institu-
tional controls by shifting the emphasis from permanence to
"long-term reliability and cost-effectiveness. "4 3 The EPA's propo-
comm. on Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12, 1993).
40 See NACEPT DISCUSSION DRAFT ON REMEDY SELECTION REFORM 2 (Oct. 1993).
"' The NACEPT Draft relates:
There is disagreement over how permanence and treatment preferences
should be dealt with in the statute .... [In situations such as DNAPLS
which cannot be cleaned up with existing available technologyJ [tihe indus-
trial community believes that where institutional and engineering controls
are sufficient to meet the health and environmental standards, they should be
considered on an equal footing with treatment options .... The environmen-




" See Interagency Group Seeks Major Superfund Remedy Selection Changes, INSIDE
EP.A. (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 1993, at 1, 3 (ex-
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sal also elevated the role of community involvement by establish-
ing community advisory groups" that would decide, with the pub-
lic's participation, whether the future land use of the Superfund
site was either "residential" or "restricted" (encompassing indus-
trial, commercial, recreational, agricultural, and park land) and
the corresponding need for groundwater as a resource. "5 The se-
lected use category would then be implemented through institu-
tional controls with the "overall goal [of returning] the site to pro-
ductive use, wherever possible." '46 As of the date of this article,
the EPA had not yet drafted a legislative proposal to reflect its
preferred options for Superfund reform47 nor endorsed a legisla-
tive proposal submitted by another entity.
B. Legislative Proposals for Superfund Reauthorization
Although most congressional activity on Superfund
reauthorization during 1993 occurred in committee hearings fo-
cused on specific Superfund reform issues rather than in debate
over pending reform legislation," several legislative proposals for
Superfund reauthorization that specifically addressed institutional
controls were introduced within the House of Representatives.
cerpting comments and responses from the EPA's proposal on remedy selection: "the [rem-
edy] that is protective of human health and the environment and provides the best balance
between long-term reliability and cost would be the preferred alternative").
" The EPA explained that Community Work Groups (CWGs), made up of a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community, would make recommendations as to the future
land use at the site. The EPA would then be required to give the CWGs' recommendations
serious consideration during remedy selection. When CWGs recommended residential use,
"the groundwater resource needs of [the current or future] residents would generally be
considered in determining whether remediation of the water is necessary." Id. at 2-3.
" Id. at 2.
I /d.
See generally Administration-Congressional Superfund Panel Raises Outsiders'
Ire, INSIDE EP.A.'s SUPERFUND REPORT (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Washington,
D.C.), Dec. 1, 1993, at 8 (relating that although a work group had convened to begin
drafting legislation incorporating the Clinton administration's views, the interagency task
force had not yet resolved interagency disputes on the major underlying issues such as the
status of retroactivity under Superfund).
" See, e.g., Reauthorization of Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12, 1993); Superfund Cleanup Ef-
forts: Hearings Before the Transportation and Hazardous Materials Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 21, May 5 and 13,
1993); Communities' Role in Superfund Hazardous Waste Clean-up: Hearings before the
Transportation and Hazardous Materials Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 1993).
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Two of these proposals, Representative Richard John Santorum's
(R-PA) House Bill 1125"1 and Representatives Tim Penny's (D-
MN) and John Kasich's (R-OH) Amendment to House Bill 3400
(the Government Reform and Savings Act of 1993-a $90 billion
dollar general deficit reduction bill), 50 proposed to amend Section
121(a) of CERCLA by directing the EPA in selecting remedial
actions for Superfund sites to give a preference to the use of insti-
tutional controls and containment methods rather than permanent
treatment technologies. Supporters of the Penny-Kasich Amend-
ment estimated that its preference for the use of institutional con-
trols and containment methods during remedy selection would
save the Superfund program $1.2 billion. Representative Al Swift
(D-WA) presented the opposition's arguments against establishing
a preference for institutional controls and containment measures
in the Penny-Kasich amendment:
1) not adequately protective of human health or the environ-
ment at many sites because hazardous waste is left in place;
2) less incentive to develop innovative treatment technologies;
4 House Bill 1125 would amend Superfund as follows:
SECTION 1. PREFERENCE FOR INTERIM MEASURES IN
SUPERFUND RESPONSE ACTIONS.
Section 121(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9621(a)) is amended
by adding at the end the following: "Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of this Act, in selecting appropriate remedial actions, the Presi-
dent shall give a preference to the use of institutional controls (such
as deed and access restrictions, monitoring, and provision of alternate
water supplies), containment methods (including caps, slurry walls,
and surface water diversion), and other interim measures, rather than
permanent treatment technologies, if such interim measures are suffi-
cient to protect the public health, welfare, and the environment."
H.R. 1125, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., (1993) (Feb. 26, 1993 version). This bill also would
require the President to submit to Congress annual reports for the next several years detail-
ing the estimated savings resulting from the use of such interim measures in comparison to
using permanent treatment technologies, id. As of the beginning of 1994, this bill remains
active with at least 10 cosponsors.
" The pertinent section of the Penny-Kasich amendment to House Bill 3400, § 217,
entitled Preference for Interim Measures in Superfund Response Actions reads:
in any record of decision issued on or after October 1, 1994, the President
shall give a preference to the use of institutional controls (such as deed and
access restrictions, monitoring, and provision of alternate water supplies),
[and) containment methods.
139 CONG. REC. H10480 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
61 CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c) (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
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3) greater costs to states which may bear the burden of funding
long-term maintenance costs required by containment and insti-
tutional control remedies;
4) creation of permanent dead zones where redevelopment of af-
fected areas is hindered, potentially affecting minority communi-
ties disproportionately;
5) reduction in cleanup standards with little or no correlative
reduction in federal budget outlays; and
6) passing on of cleanup costs may result ultimately in greater
cleanup costs.62
The Penny-Kasich Amendment was subsequently narrowly
defeated in the House by a vote of 219 to 213.63 This close vote
illustrates that at the end of 1993, legislative support was nearly
evenly divided between both sides of the hotly contested and ongo-
ing debate over whether Superfund should continue to prefer per-
manent treatment measures or be amended to prefer more cost-
effective measures, such as institutional controls.
On November 28, 1993, Representative Fred Upton (R-MI)
introduced a broad Superfund reauthorization proposal, House
Bill 3620,11 which presents a more restrictive role for institutional
controls than the Santorum Bill, House Bill 1125, and the Penny-
Kasich Amendment to House Bill 3400, by narrowly defining
when institutional controls may be appropriate for a particular
site. Within Title II of House Bill 3620, institutional controls are
both defined 55 and expressly allowed in the context of voluntary
cleanups, so long as the party undertaking voluntary response ac-
tion can show either that "i) other response measures are imprac-
ticable for economic, technological or implementation reasons, or
ii) engineering and/or institutional controls are necessary to con-
12 139 CONG. REc. H10272 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Rep. Swift).
Swift also introduced letters from various parties opposed to the Penny-Kasich amendment.
In particular, Carol Browner stated the EPA's interest in "more effectively incorporating
land use planning into Superfund remedy decisions" but expressed the EPA's opposition to
legislative proposals for reauthorization that are outside of the administrative branch's own
reauthorization process. 139 CONG REC. H10273 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (letter from
Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator, to Rep. Al Swift (Nov. 19, 1993)).
53 139 CONG. REC. H 10794 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993) (Roll 609).
" Contaminated Sites Reclamation Act, H.R. 3620, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
' This bill expressly defines the term "institutional controls" to mean "any mecha-
nism used to limit human activity or exposure at or near a contaminated site .... Institu-
tional controls include fences or gates, deed restrictions, prohibitions on well use, and warn-
ing signs." Id. at § 201(8) (Nov. 28, 1993 version).
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trol the source of contamination or prevent exposure as part of an
overall remedial action program."566
Upton's reform proposal codifies but does not go beyond the
role of institutional controls within the current Superfund scheme
as discussed above in part II. Moreover, House Bill 3620 mentions
institutional controls only in the context of voluntary cleanup,
which raises the question of whether they may be selected at sites
where a party involuntarily performs cleanup pursuant to an ad-
ministrative or judicial order. Therefore, House Bill 3620 unduly
restricts institutional controls to voluntary cleanups, and does not
acknowledge or expand the use of institutional controls at sites
where future land and water uses are nonresidential.
C. Reauthorization Proposals from Private Entities
Many private entities, such as individual companies, trade as-
sociations and public interest and environmental groups, are par-
ticipating in the Superfund reauthorization process. Most of these
entities advocate their own particular positions and points of view.
However, the National Commission on Superfund (NCS) has re-
leased a consensus reform proposal, resulting from negotiations
between representatives of such diverse groups as public interest
and environmental groups, corporate leaders in the chemical and
waste disposal industries, insurance and banking industries, educa-
tors, and state and local governments. The role of institutional
controls under the NCS consensus proposal remains uncertain. 7
For example, the NCS proposal expands the role of community
groups in cleanup decisions, a factor that seems likely to increase
the role of land-use in remedy selection and, thus, may favor site-
specific remedies, such as institutional controls. However, it does
not alter the current Superfund preference for treatment over con-
tainment measures (and similarly institutional controls)58 and
would promulgate national cleanup standards, factors that would
" Id. at § 205(a) (Nov. 28, 1993 version).
" See generally 'Consensus' Superfund Plan Comes Under Attack from Industry, 15
INSIDE E.P.A. (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 7, 1994, at 5-6.
" Reports state that Representative Swift had asked his staff to draft a legislative
proposal based on the December 1993 NCS consensus proposal. See id. Based upon his role
as leader of the opposition to the Penny-Kasich amendment, it is unlikely that Swift would
introduce a reform proposal elevating or expanding the role of institutional controls at
Superfund sites.
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not encourage the application of institutional controls at
Superfund sites.
CONCLUSION
At a minimum, Superfund should be amended to acknowl-
edge the current and widespread use of institutional controls as an
integral and appropriate component of a remedy at most
Superfund sites.5 9 Only minor revisions to Section 121 are needed
to reflect that institutional controls have proved necessary to sup-
plement permanent treatment-based remedies at Superfund sites
where some residual contamination remains and to acknowledge
that institutional controls may be an integral component of a pre-
ferred remedy.60 An expansive definition of "institutional con-
trols" should also be added to Section 101.1'
The debate on Superfund remedy selection reform continues
to focus on whether or not to shift the emphasis from Section
121's preference for permanent treatment in remedy selection to
Section 121's rather contrary preference for cost-effective reme-
dies such as institutional controls. The pending reauthorization
proposals echo this debate, presenting nearly a full spectrum of
positions on the role of institutional controls at Superfund sites.
Representative Swift presented perhaps the most restrictive view
of institutional controls in his opposition to the Penny-Kasich
amendment, though he did not dispute the tremendous cost-sav-
ings potential to the Superfund program resulting from an in-
creased use of institutional controls. The preference for institu-
tional controls and containment measures at all sites presented by
the Penny-Kasich Amendment to H.R. 3400 and the Santorum
Bill, H.R. 1125, represents the opposite extreme because institu-
tional controls may not be an appropriate remedy at every
Superfund site.
B' This approach of codifying the status quo is best illustrated by the Upton bill, H.R.
3620, 103rd Cong., ist Sess. (1993), if the Upton bill's provisions addressing institutional
controls were not limited to voluntary cleanups.
60 For example, following § 121(c)'s current instruction that the President may select
a "remedial action that results in hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants re-
maining at the site," insert an additional sentence reading: "In such cases, the President
shall consider the implementation of appropriate institutional controls at the site to assure
the protection of human health and the environment."
11 See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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The EPA proposes to consider cost-effective remedies, such as
institutional controls, during remedy selection if appropriately
based upon the future land and water use of the site, as deter-
mined by the local community. By recognizing that all sites might
not need to be cleaned up to pristine levels, particularly if the cur-
rent and anticipated future uses of the groundwater and land at
the site as established by the local community are nonresidential,
the EPA's proposed reforms do reflect a paradigm shift within the
Superfund program. Nevertheless, the EPA's proposal appears to
strike the most appropriate balance of all the current reform pro-
posals between the status quo of the current Superfund scheme,
which prefers permanent treatment remedies, and the unbridled
preference for cost-effective remedies at all sites offered by several
of the legislative reform proposals. This proposal reflects the
EPA's conclusion that expanding the role of institutional controls
in remedy selection is one mechanism by which it can still achieve
its mandate to protect the public health and environment while
significantly reducing cleanup costs and returning Superfund sites
to beneficial uses faster and more efficiently. Although the EPA
has not yet presented a legislative proposal, only minor changes to
Section 121 of the current statutory scheme are necessary to in-
corporate the EPA's views for institutional controls. The EPA's
proposal for remedy selection reform is based on future uses as
determined by local communities, which bear many burdens asso-
ciated with Superfund cleanups, and allows the local communities
a greater voice in the remedy selection and implementation pro-
cess as well as the benefits of obtaining expedited response actions
for Superfund sites within their areas.
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